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Summary 
This paper analyzes how the implementation of a food safety standard affects firms’ 
strategic behaviour within the context of a food chain. We provide a formal analysis, which 
considers that the sanitary risk results from a strong heterogeneity of upstream production 
conditions and the final demand depends on consumers’ risk estimations (given that 
consumers may underestimate or, conversely, overestimate the sanitary risk).  
We show how downstream (processing or retailing) firms may be prompted to play a 
positive role with respect to food safety, either by selecting only the safest upstream 
producers or by encouraging the improvement of suppliers’ production conditions.  
When the degree of consumers’ risk misperception is relatively low, then a downstream 
firm may adopt the latter strategy and increase the marketed quantities as the food safety 
standard is improved. However, we show that the actual contamination risk is not 
necessarily decreasing in the level of the food safety standard. 
 
KEYWORDS: food safety standards, market power, risk misperception 
Introduction  
Over the last decade, public concern over the safety of food has increased as a result of 
sanitary crisis (Mead et al., 1999, Roe et al., 2000). As a consequence, increasing food 
safety regulation has arised, which covers a broad range of regulatory techniques, from 
public to private and from low interventionist to highly prescriptive obligations.  
On the one hand, public authorities have tightened food safety legislations and created new 
control procedures. The classical rationale for government regulation in the risk and 
environmental area is the presence of externalities. Indeed, the operation of business often 
generates health pollution, water pollution and toxic waste. Health, safety and 
environmental regulations thus specify the technological requirements that must be met or 
the pollution standards that cannot be exceeded. Thus, it is well known that the main 
feature of regulation is that it directly controls economic agent’s behaviour and affects an 
activity before the externality is generated (see for example Viscusi, Harrington and 
Vernon, 2005).   
On the other hand, private systems and certification programs have been implemented by 
processors or distributors, aimed at meeting customer expectations in terms of food safety. 
These "strategies" are often implemented to respond to higher consumer requirements and 
are attempt to achieve improved both product safety and quality characteristics (Bazoche et 
al., 2005, Havinga, 2006, Fulponi, 2006).  
As it was noticed by Henson and Caswell (1999), there are a lot of arguments for co-
ordinating the incentives of public with those of private systems. Moreover, these authors 
point out that private systems may act as a mechanism to increase market share by 
delivering higher or more dependable quality, but they may act also to protect current 
market share from erosion. In both cases, there are incentives for the adoption of private 
controls by individual operators in the food supply chain and it is well obvious that   352
standard requirements affect the strategic behaviours within the vertical relationships, 
between producers and retailers.  
Given these premises, the objective of this paper is to evaluate the impact of safety 
standards on the strategic behaviour of economic agents in the context of agri-food chains. 
We develop our analysis in the framework of the theory of industrial organization and 
examine a vertical relationship, where upstream producers (farmers) have do adopt a 
process standard. This process standard requires a minimum level of equipment which 
could lead to high investments by certain producers. We show how the compliance with 
this standard depends also on the strategic behaviour of the downstream firm, who 
processes and distributes the product. Then, with respect to the strategic interactions among 
the supply chain participants, we highlight some unexpected effects of these standards, 
namely a positive effect on the number of producers who accept to adapt their equipments 
to the standard. We also show some possible perverse effects, namely we point out that the 
actual contamination risk is not necessarily decreasing in the level of standard.   
Two main hypothesis delimit our framework. At first, we suppose that a downstream firm 
does not have any possibility to fix its own private norm to reinforce the standard defined 
by the public authority, but, conversely, completely maintains its strategic flexibility to 
select the best equipped up-stream producers. Secondly, we assume that consumers are 
informed about the efforts that firms exert along the production-commercialization process, 
but they may underestimate or, conversely, overestimate the sanitary risk arising from 
economic activities
1. The firms thus have to adapt their strategic behaviour by taking into 
account the foreseeable distorsions on the final market. 
Background  
There exists a large swathe of the literature concerning the process of compliance of firms 
to the food safety regulation and the effects of food safey standards on firms’ strategic 
behaviour. 
With respect to the first issue, Henson and Heasman (1998) focuse on the process by which 
firms comply with food safety regulations and illustrate a model of compliance process. 
The authors show that firms decide to comply if the perceived marginal benefit of 
compliance is equal to, or exceeds, the perceived marginal cost. However, the decision 
whether to commit depends on adaptation costs and represents a long-term decision.  These 
authors also argue that the compliance decision is affected by the extent to which firms are 
aware of cost-benefit relationships associated with regulations. 
Loader and Hobbs (1999) adresse the question of firms’ responses to changes in food safety 
legislation and suggest the necessity for firms to respond rapidly to food safety issues – as 
they directly affect the marketability of products – to assure consumers that their products 
meet safety requirements. Moreover, these authors point out the necessity to take into 
account the role of vertical relationships. In fact, they argue that food safety regulation 
encourages firms to follow an organisational strategy aimed at building closer supply chain 
relationships. In this spirit, Unnevehr and Jensen (1999) show that the use of mandating 
HACCP may create incentives for vertical coordination to control food safety throughout 
                                                           
1 The issue of consumers perception of sanitary risk has been examined by several contributions. See for example, 
McCarthy and Henson (2005), for an analysis of the major facets of perceived risk for beef among Irish 
consumers. Yeung and Yee (2002), show that health loss is the most important component of perceived risk, 
followed by psycological, financial, time and taste losses. Lobb, Mazzocchi and Traill (2007) suggest a statistical 
strategy for explaining how food purchasing intentions are influenced by different levels of risk perception and 
trust in food safety information. Costa-Font and Mossialos (2007) focus on how individuals learn about the risks 
and benefits of genetically modified (GM) food, along with the influence of information sources on the formation 
of both risk and benefits perceptions. See also Krystallis and Arvanitoyannis (2005) for the analysis of Greek 
consumers’ beliefs, attitudes and intentions towards GM food products and Rosati and Saba (2004) for an analysis 
of public perception of risks associated with different food-related hazards and perception of reliability of various 
sources providing information on food-related risks.   353
the production process. Moreover, it may pose a greater burden on small firms, due to the 
large investments needed, and thus result in concentration processes (see also Henson and 
Caswell, 1999). 
Following a quantitative approach, Antle (1999) provides an analytical framework for the 
measurement of the costs of regulations and discusses the use and limitations of currently 
available benefit and cost information for quantitative regulatory impact assessment. 
Indeed, several contributions examine the economic implications of food safety regulatory 
standards using a cost and benefit analysis (see for example Caswell and Kleinschmit, 
1997; Viscusi, 2006). This cost-benefit research attempts to measure the cost for firms of 
implementing food safety regulations and compare it to the benefits in terms of the reduced 
societal costs of consumers mortality and foodborne illness.  
With respect to the effects of food safey standards on firms’ strategic behaviour, some 
contributions have taken into account the dimension of firms’ behaviour in the context of 
vertical relationships. These studies often refer to a context of moral hazard. Thus, they take 
into account the opportunistic behaviour of upstream sellers, who exploit the fact that many 
food products characteristics remain uncertain to downstream buyers in the course of 
market transactions. Hence, buyers run the risk to pay a premium price for inferior products 
or to use, or consume, substances which are harmful (health risk). Incentive systems must 
thus be designed to induce compliance with specified regulations and standards. For an 
example of this type of models in the context of food chains, see Hirschauer (2004), who 
specifies the conditions at which optimal control intensity and price can be determined. In 
this line of research, Starbird and Amanor-Boadu (2007) use a monopsonistic pricipal-agent 
model in the context of adverse selection to examine how contracts that include traceability 
can be used to deter unsafe producers, within the context of a food chain. They show that 
the motivation for the processor to select against unsafe producers depends on the 
magnitude of the failure costs and the proportion of them allocated to producers. 
Furthermore, it is well known – in the literature concerning the analysis of safety regulation 
– that as firms engage in externality-creating activities, then they may derive a profit (or 
private benefit) from it. They also may reduce the risk, by exerting precaution efforts and 
supporting the related costs. Thus, the implementation of safety standards, as a means of 
controlling risky activities, affects firms’ strategic choices. Nevertheless, to our knowledge, 
a few papers analyze the effects of standards on firms’ strategic behaviour. For example, in 
a recent theoretical paper, Shavell (2007) analyzes the effects of the level of legal standards 
on the parties’ level of activity, this latter representing whether or how much a potential 
injurer engages in a particular (risky) activity. It is shown that overly strict legal standards 
may discourage parties from engaging in socially desiderable activities, when standards are 
required by the regulatory system.  
Nevertheless, the market dimension (that is, the effects of food safety regulation on firms’ 
strategic behaviour in terms of quantity and price) is often neglected by this kind of models. 
Therefore, the effects of consumers’ attitudes towards a risky product are not taken into 
account and furthermore, the willingness to pay of consumers for food safety is often 
ignored.
2 
However, in a seminal paper, Polinsky and Rogerson (1983) have studied this issue by 
fixing, from a theoretical point of view, the basis of the formalization that we propose at the 
beginning of our paper. Indeed, these authors argue that introducing the market dimension 
requires to take into account consumers’ risk misperceptions (several analysis of 
consumers’ risk perception within the food sector are provided in the literature; see for 
example McCarthy and Henson, 2005, Yeung and Yee, 2002, Lobb, Mazzocchi and Traill, 
                                                           
2 Some models have been used in order to derive expressions for willingness to pay (WTP) for reduced risk 
(Harrington, Portney, 1987, Cropper, Freeman, 1991, Berger et al. 1997). Several studies have shown an increase 
of consumers’ WTP for products characterized by a lower risk of contamination (Buzby, Read, Skees, 1995, Fox 
et al., 1995).   354
2007, Costa-Font and Mossialos, 2007, Krystallis and Arvanitoyannis, 2005, Rosati and 
Saba, 2004). 
As far as markets react to the perceived and not to the actual risk, then consumers’ risk 
misperceptions may affect the strategic behaviour of economic agents and thus the design 
of the regulation. In this paper, we show how both the strategic behaviour of firms within 
the context of vertical relationships and the consumers’ risk misperception may influence 
the effectiveness of the food safety regulation.  
Objectives 
The objective of this paper is to evaluate the impact of safety standards on the strategic 
behaviour of economic agents in agri-food chains. We develop our analysis in the 
framework of the theory of industrial organization and study the strategic interactions 
among food chain participants (upstream producers, downstream processing or retailing 
firm, final consumers), when the sanitary risk results from the upstream production 
conditions.  
For this purpose, we study a vertical relationship where upstream producers (farmers) have 
do adopt a process standard. This standard requires a minimum level of equipment which 
could lead to high investments by certain producers. We consider that the downstream firm 
does not have any possibility to fix its own private norm to reinforce the standard defined 
by the public authority, but, conversely, completely maintains its strategic flexibility to 
select the best equipped upstream producers. Moreover, consumers are supposed to be 
informed about the efforts that firms exert along the production-commercialization process, 
but they may underestimate or, conversely, overestimate the sanitary risk arising from the 
economic activities. Thus, the final demand depends on consumers’ risk estimations. 
Methodology  
Statements of the formalization 
We consider a vertical relationship between  J  upstream producers and one downstream 
retailer. Following Giraud-Héraud, Hammoudi and Soler (2006), the upstream producers 
are differentiated according to their equipment level, which is represented by a one-
dimensional parameter e, assumed to be uniformly distributed within the interval [0,1], 
according to the density function f(e) 1 ≡ . Each of the upstream producers can offer one 
unit of the good in the intermediary market. However, this unit is more or less risky, 
according to the equipment level of the producer. Thus, the contamination risk results from 
upstream production conditions.  
The contamination risk arising from each individual producer, whose equipment level is e, 
is given by  (e) σ , where  (.) σ  is a decreasing function of e. For the sake of simplicity, we 
consider that  (e) 1 e σ =−. We then have  (0) 1 σ =  and  (1) 0 σ = . Hence, the risk is 
certain with a producer characterized by the minimum level of equipment and null with a 
producer characterized by the maximum level of equipment. As we consider that each 
producer always supplies the same quantity of product (non-elastic individual supply), the 






σσ == ∫  (1) 
We consider that σ  defines the probability of crisis in the end market. This initial 
probability can be modified if at least one of the producers changes his equipment over the 
course of time. Then, the density f(e) will shift to a density f’(e) and change the level of σ  
given by (1). We will refer toσ as the contamination risk in the rest of this paper.    355
We suppose that, in order to enter the intermediary market, an upstream producer must, at 
least, reach a certain level of equipment 
s e , which corresponds to the food safety standard 
implemented in the selected market. We assume that the fixed cost for each producer of 
type  e, who wants to participate in the intermediary market with a level of standard 
s e , 
takes a linear form  s Max{0,e e } − . Then, each producer is assumed to be price taker in his 
decision to enter or not the intermediary market.  
In the end market, consumers are identical and risk neutral. Let σ  be the true probability of 
crisis in the end market. Following Polinsky and Rogerson (1983), we define by 
(1 ) λ σ − each consumer's perception of σ , where  1 λ ≤ . Since larger values of λ  
correspond to lower estimates of the contamination risk, λ  may be interpreted as a measure 
of the extent of the consumers’ risk misperception. Three representative degrees of 
consumers’ risk misperception are identified:  1 λ = +  (maximal underestimation
3),  0 λ =  
(no misperception) or  1 λ =−  (overestimation)
4. Then, the aggregate inverse demand for 
the product, when the risk perception is (1 ) λ σ −  is given by:  
p( , , ) x
with
(, ,) ( 1 ) l
βαλ σ






 (2)   
Equation (2) considers that the maximum level of price  (, ,) β αλσ  which consumers are 
willing to pay, that we denote “consumers’s reservation price”, depends both on the actual 
level of risk and on the degree of consumers’ risk misperception. The parameter l  
represents the monetary loss for consumers for each unit of the product which is 
contaminated.  
The quantity  x  is bought by the monopsonist in the intermediary market and supplied to 
the end market. We suppose that the monopsonist can always select the producers in order 
to obtain the quantity  x  with the best levels of equipment within the interval [0,1]. Thus, 
we denote by e %  the threshold of equipment starting from which the producers are selected 




=− %  (3) 
The risk assessment on the market corresponds to the knowledge of the relative position of 
e %  and  s e . As a result, the level of risk depends on the level of quantity  x  demanded by 
the monopsonist on the intermediary market.  
Let us denote by 
s ˆ x J(1 e ) =−, the quantity asked by the monopsonist, such that all the 
initially well-equipped producers are selected (that is 
s ee = % ). Using (3), we verify that 
s ee ≥ %  if and only if  ˆ x x ≤ .  
                                                           
3 This case represents the particular case in which consumers treat the good as if it were perfectly safe. 
4 Consumers’ purchase decision is affected both by the degree of risk’s misperception and by the trust in food 
safety information (Lobb, Mazzocchi, Traill, 2007). Consumers’ risk misperception can be interpreted as a 
psychological trait of consumers. They may under- or overestimate the contamination risk according to several 
determinants; namely perceived product’s consistency, interest in cooking, interest in the product, experience and 
confidence in purchase location (McCarthy and Henson, 2005), health loss, followed by psychological, financial, 
time and taste losses (Yeung and Yee, 2002). Moreover, advertisement and communication campaigns potentially 
influence risk perceptions (Costa-Font and Mossialos, 2007).   356
Therefore, if  ˆ x x ≤  (that is 
s ee ≥ % ), no selected producer has to modify his equipment in 
order to supply the intermediary market. The statistical distribution of producers’ 
equipments on the support [e,1] %  is then unchanged (with  f(e) 1 ≡ ).  
If  ˆ x x >  (that is 
s ee < % ), the producers which are initially located between e %  and 
s e  have 
to modify their equipment in order to supply the intermediary market. As a result of the 
equipment’s upgrading for producers such that 
s eee ≤ ≤ % , the statistical distribution of the 
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%  (4) 
Definition 1.  A strategic choice of quantity  x  is denoted “Equipments non-affecting” 
(ENA)  strategy if  x  is such that no selected producer modifies his equipment, that is 
ˆ x x ≤ , or “Equipments affecting” (EA) strategy if  x  is such that some producers modify 
their equipments, that is  ˆ x x > .  
Let us denote by 
1
(, ) () ()




 the contamination risk for a given level of food 
safety standard  s e  and for a quantity  x  demanded by the monopsonist on the intermediary 



























Using (5), we verify that the risk is an increasing function of the supplied quantity. 
When the ENA strategy is implemented, the contamination risk 
s (x,e ) σ  does not depend 
on the level of the food safety standard 
s e , as the monopsonist only selects producers with 
a level of equipment higher than  s e .  
Conversely, when the EA strategy is implemented, the great quantity demanded by the 
monopsonist implies that also initially not well-equipped producers are selected (that is 
producers with a level of equipment lower than the standard 
s e ). These producers have to 
upgrade their equipment levels in order to comply with the food safety standard  s e . As a 
result, the contamination risk depends on the standard 
s e . In any case, for a given level of 
s e , the contamination risk 
s (x,e ) σ  is an increasing function of the quantity  x  demanded 
by the monopsonist, as an increase of the quantity demanded on the intermediary market 
implicitly leads to an increase of the number of producers involved.  
The contamination risk affects the monopsonist’s profit. Namely, it affects the reservation 
price and thus, the level of demand. Let us denote by ω  the price paid by the monopsonist 
on the intermediary market. The monopsonist’s expected profit 
s (x,e ) , λ π ω , when the 
consumers’ risk misperception is λ , the demanded quantity is  x , the intermediary price 
paid for that quantity is ω  and the food safety standard on the intermediary market is 
s e , is 
thus given by :   357
ss (x,e ) [ (1 ) (x,e ) l x ]x , λ πω α λ σ ω =− − − −  (6) 
The quantity choice affects the monopsonist’s expected profit by different ways. On the one 
hand, the quantity directly affects the inverse demand function. On the other hand, the 
quantity affects the contamination risk on the final market. As a result, the quantity has an 
indirect effect on the inverse demand function (by affecting the reservation price), whose 
magnitude depends both on the level of risk and on the consumers’ risk misperception. 
Monopsonist’s optimal procurement strategy 
We assume that the monopsonist has complete negociation power towards upstream 
producers in the definition of the intermediary price ω . In other words, if the monopsonist 
chooses to buy the quantity  x on the intermediary market and sell it to the end market, then 
he optimally determines a level of the intermediary price  (x) ω , so as to involve the 
number of producers required to get and sell the quantity  x .  
The monopsonist selects the producers characterized by equipments between e %  and 1. 
However, when the ENA strategy is chosen, there is no producer which modifies his 
equipment (
s ee ≥ % ), thus producers can accept a null intermediary price in order to supply 
the intermediary market. If the EA strategy is chosen, the producers which are initially 
located between e %  and 
s e  have to invest in a higher equipment (
s ee < % ). In particular, the 
producer located in  e % is the last (less equipped) producer which upgrades his equipment 
by investing 
s ee − % . Hence, he does not participate in the market if the intermediary price 
is lower than 
s ee − % . Then, we have 
s ee ω = − %  and the intermediary price is given by 
ss (x, e ) e e ω =− % . Using (3) we then obtain:  
s
s
ˆ 0i f x x
(x,e ) x












Let us underline that if an ENA strategy is implemented, then all the producers located 
within the interval 
s [e ,1] agree to enter the intermediary market. Hence, the monopsonist 
has to select only the highest equipments in order to get the quantity  x . If an EA strategy is 
implemented, then the monopsonist chooses an intermediary price  s (x, e ) ω  such that 
only the producers between e % and 1 accept to join the intermediary market.  
Using (5), (6) and (7), we then determine the optimal quantity chosen by the monopsonist 
as a function of the level of the standard 
s e .  
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monopsonist, when the food safety norm is 
s
e , is given by: 
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The property  (e ) 1 e λ λλ Ψ =−  is verified.
5   
Results 
Using (8), we can easily determine the expressions of the other variables:  
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ω , obtained by (7) 
the total upstream producers’ profit 
s
,e, B(e ) ω % , given by
6: 
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, given by (8), we then define the 
following three types of food safety regulation, which can be implemented by the public 
authority.  
Definition 2.  A regulation whose level of food safety standard is given by 
s e , is denoted 
“weak” if 
s ee λ ≤ , “moderate” if 
s eee λ λ ≤ ≤  and “strong” if 
s ee λ > .    
The expressions (8) and (9) characterize the monopsonist’s optimal strategy, given the type 
of regulation chosen by the public authority. Using this terminology, we provide in the next 
sections, an analysis of the effects of each type of regulation in terms of both food safety 
and surplus of the different agents. 
                                                           
5 This property allows to verify that the optimal quantity choice of the monopsonist is continuous in 
s
e . 
6 By substituting (3) and (7) into (10), we easily  obtain the expression of the total upstream producers’ profit 
s B(e )  as a function of the food safety standard.   359
Food safety regulation, monopsonist’s selecting 
strategy and the level of contamination risk  
Starting from the monopsonist’ optimal quantity choice associated with each type of food 
safety regulation and by comparing it to the quantity 
s ˆ x J(1 e ) =−, we obtain the 
following results.  
Result 1. If a weak regulation is implemented, then the monopsonist chooses 
an ENA strategy. Neither the optimal quantity nor the contamination risk are 
affected by the food safety standard. 
Weak regulations do not affect the upstream equipments levels. Thus, as only the initially 
best equipped producers are selected by the monopsonist, then no equipments’ upgrading is 
required for producers to participate in the market. Furthermore, if no specific production 
conditions are required to access the market (that is, if the food safety standard is fixed at 
zero), then the exceeding supply reinforces the monopsonist’s negociation power. Hence, 
the intermediary price equals zero (see Figure 1 below
7).  
Moreover, if this type of regulation is implemented, an improvement of the food safety 
standard does not affect either the monopsonist’s optimal quantity choice or the 
contamination risk, regardless of the degree of consumers’ risk misperception. From this 
point of view, weak regulations result in the same effects which would arise from a passive 
attitude of the public authorities towards food safety (that is, in the benchmark situation 
s e0 = ). 
[insert Figure 1] 
Result 2.  If a moderate regulation is implemented, then the monopsonist 
chooses an ENA strategy. However, the contamination risk is lower than in 
the context of a weak regulation and decreasing in the food safety standard.  
As the weak regulations, the moderate ones do not affect the upstream equipments levels. 
Indeed, the monopsonist selects all the initially well-equipped producers and does not pay 
them any remuneration. However, the level of food safety is improved with respect to the 
context of weak regulations. Moreover, an increase of the food safety standard – within the 
context of moderate regulations (
s eee λ λ ≤ ≤ ) – affects the monopsonist’s strategic 
behaviour, which in turn determines a food safety improvement. Indeed, if the food safety 
standard is reinforced, the contamination risk decreases.  
This result can be explained as follows. As the food safety standard increases, the 
monopsonist anticipates that by implementing an EA strategy he could have an action on 
the reservation price (through an action on the contamination risk), but he would have to 
pay a positive remuneration to the upstream producers. Moreover, this remuneration would 
increase in the level of the food safety standard (see Figure 1). The monopsonist thus 
prefers to improve demand by reducing the supplied quantity, rather than by implementing 
an EA strategy and paying the producers a positive remuneration.  
Result 3.  If a strong regulation is implemented, then the monopsonist 
chooses an EA strategy. The contamination risk is not necessarily lower than 
in the context of weak regulations and is not necessarily decreasing in the 
food safety standard. 
                                                           
7 Figures 1-5 are created according to values of the parameters which are consistent with the basic model’s 
assumptions; namely, they have been chosen within consistent ranges of each variable, that is quantity, price and 
probability of crisis ( J 100 = ,  200 α = ,  l5 0 = ). The following representative degrees of misperception have 
been represented : overestimation ( 1 λ = − ), perfect estimation ( 0 λ = ), and maximal underestimation 
( 1 λ =+ ).   360
If a strong regulation is implemented, the monopsonist selects also initially not well-
equipped producers and pay them a positive remuneration, in order to support their 
equipments’ upgrading. As a result, the strategic behaviour of the monopsonist affects the 
contamination risk and thus the reservation price. We show that, if this type of regulation is 
implemented, the food safety is not necessarily improved with respect to the context of 
weak regulations.  
Figures 2-3 and 4 below illustrate the effects of the food safety regulation on the 
monopsonist’s strategic choice of quantity, on the contamination risk and on the final price. 
[insert Figures 2-3-4] 
The monopsonist’s reaction to a reinforcement of a strong regulation and the consequences 
on the contamination risk are affected by the degree of consumers’ risk misperception. 
Namely, the improvement of the food safety standard implies a decrease of quantity when 
risk’s misperception is relatively high and an increase of quantity conversely. Figure 3 
shows that in latter case, the contamination risk is not necessarily decreasing in the food 
safety standard.  
In the context of strong regulations, the effect of a reinforcement of the food safety standard 
on the optimal quantity depends on two key-factors. One the one hand, as the intermediary 
price is increasing in the food safety standard (Figure 1), then the monopsonist has an 
incentive to decrease the quantity if the food safety standard becomes more demanding. On 
the other hand, as the reservation price increases in the standard (through the reduction of 
the contamination risk), the monopsonist has an incentive to increase the quantity if the 
standard increases.  
The degree of consumers’ risk misperception affects this monopsonist’s trade-off. Namely, 
the lower is the degree of misperception, the higher is the increase of reservation price 
which can be obtained through a reduction of the contamination risk. As a result, when 
misperception is relatively low, the second effect dominates the first one. Thus, the 
monopsonist’s may have a strategic behaviour, such that he takes advantage of a relatively 
low degree of consumers’ risk misperception (and of the related marginal effect on the 
reservation price) and increases the demanded quantity in response to a food safety standard 
improvement (see Figure 2). Conversely, as the degree of consumers’ risk misperception is 
relatively high, then the second effect does no longer dominate the first one and quantity 
decreases in the food safety standard, even if the action of the monopsonist on the 
contamination risk may improve reservation price.  
Moreover, in the particular case such that consumers completely underestimate the risk 
( 1 λ =+ ) – that is they treat the good as if it were perfectly safe – then the second effect 
completely disappears. That is, the monopsonist has no longer the possibility to improve 
demand by having an action on the contamination risk. Hence, the monoposonist’s quantity 
choice is only affected by the evolution of the intermediary price according to the level of 
the food safety standard (see Figures 1 and 2).  
Then, the monopsonist’s response to a food safety improvement – in terms of quantity – 
affects the level of contamination risk. The effect of a reinforcement of the food safety 
standard on the contamination risk is thus strictly arising from the monopsonist’s quantity 
choice. Moreover, the contamination risk is a function of the food safety standard. As a 
result, the effect of the food safety standard on the contamination risk depends on two key-
factors. One the one hand, the contamination risk increases in quantity, as an increase of the 
quantity demanded on the intermediary market implicitly leads to an increase of the number 
of producers involved. One the other hand, as an EA strategy is implemented, the 
contamination risk is a decreasing function of the food safety standard. Thus, the 
contamination risk may increase in the food safety standard, namely as far as the first effect 
dominates the second one. We verify that the first effect is greater, the lower is the degree 
of misperception (see Figure 3). Thus, food safety regulation may have a contradictory 
effect with respect to the objective of a food safety’s improvement; namely when the 
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In addition, Figure 4 shows that – for a given type of regulation and level of food safety 
standard – relatively low degrees of misperception imply higher levels of final price. 
However, when the degree of misperception is relatively low, a strong regulation does not 
necessarily imply a higher price, with respect to a weak regulation. Moreover, a strong 
regulation may determine a food safety improvement and – at the same time – a lower final 
price (with respect to the weak regulation).  
If underestimation is maximal ( 1 λ = + ), then the implementation of a food safety standard 
implies a greater quantity restriction on the end market with respect to the absence of 
standard (Figure 2). Moreover, as the quantity restriction increases in the food safety 
standard, then the final price increases if the standard becomes more demanding (Figures 2-
4). As a result, when consumers treat the good as if it were perfeclty safe, a food safety 
standard improvement determines a decrease of consumers’ surplus
8 and an increase of 
final price. 
Food safety regulation, monopsonist’s strategic 
behaviour and participation of upstream producers 
Given the food safety standard 





which in turn determines de facto the number of upstream producers, which are excluded 




%  the threshold equipment starting from 
which upstream producers are involved in the market (participating producers), when the 
level of misperception is λ  and the food safety standard is 
s e . 
Result 4.  The number of producers selected by the monopsonist is not 
affected by the food safety standard if a weak regulation is implemented but 
decreases in the food safety standard if a moderate regulation is 
implemented. 
Figure 5 below shows the effects of the food safety regulation on the number of 
producers selected by the monopsonist. A relatively great reinforcement of the food safety 
standard (switching from weak to moderate regulations) implies a decrease of the number 
of upstream producers participating in the market, regardless of the degree of consumers’ 
risk misperception. 
[insert Figure 5] 
A switch from weak to moderate regulations, does not affect the monopsonist’s selecting 
strategy: the monopsonist continues to exert his negociation power towards upstream 
producers and pay them a null remuneration, even if the food safety standard increases. As 
the monopsonist decreases quantity in order to improve demand (see Result 2), then the 
number of producers participating in the market decreases. 
Result 5. If a strong regulation is implemented, then the number of upstream 
producers involved increases (decreases) in the food safety standard when 
the degree of misperception is relatively low (high).  
If the Government is supposed to minimize the threshold equipment, in order to minimize 
upstream producers’ exclusion, then the analysis of the threshold equipment as a function 
of the food safety standard points out an important policy implication, which is illustrated 
by the following result. 
                                                           
8 Using (8), (9) and (11), we easily verify that consumers’ surplus varies according to the quantity chosen by the 
monopsonist.   362
Result 6. An exclusion-minimizing Government chooses a weak regulation 
(or  
s
0 e = ), when the degree of consumers’ risk misperception is relatively 
high and the strongest regulation (
s
1 e = ) when the degree of consumers’ 
risk misperception is relatively low.  
If the Government is supposed to minimize the threshold equipment, in order to minimize 
upstream producers’ exclusion, then he has two opposite strategies. He chooses either a null 
or a maximal standard, according to the degree of consumers’ risk misperception. Namely, 
if misperception is sufficiently low, then paradoxically producers’ exclusion is minimized 
by imposing the most demanding standard (Figure 5).  
Let us detail the link between consumers’ risk misperception and upstream producers’ 
exclusion. The consumers’ risk misperception affects the monopsonist’s strategic 
behaviour, which in turn affects the exclusion of upstream producers.  
On the one hand, it is shown that – for a given type of regulation and a given level of 
standard – relatively low degrees of misperception favour the choice of a food safety 
standard such that producers’ exclusion is relatively high (Figure 5). In fact, the exclusion 
is decreasing in the degree of consumers’ risk misperception, for a given type of regulation 
and level of standard. On the other hand, when the degree of misperception is relatively 
low, strong regulations do not necessarily imply a higher exclusion with respect to weak 
regulations. Indeed, we verify that for a relatively high level of standard, within the context 
of strong regulations, the participation of upstream producers is higher than in the case of 
weak regulations (Figure 5). 
Moreover, when the degree of misperception is relatively low, we show that two different 
levels of food safety standard may exist (in the context of strong regulations) such that the 
same contamination risk arises and the more demanding standard corresponds to a lower 
upstream producers’ exclusion (Figures 3 and 5). That is, paradoxically, a lower upstream 
producers’ exclusion may be achieved by choosing the more demanding standard as a 
condition to access the market. As a result, the monopsonist’s strategic behaviour, such that 
the quantity increases in the standard, may generate a positive effect in terms of upstream 
producers’ market access.  
Moreover, we show that the upstream producers’ exclusion may be minimized by choosing 
the most demanding standard, that is 
s
1 e =  , which in turn determines the choice of an EA 
strategy by the monopsonist. As a result, relatively low degrees of consumers’ 
misperception favour the participation of initially not well-equipped producers (as the 
monopsonist has interest in paying them a positive remuneration in order to have an action 
on the reservation price).  
In addition, we show that, paradoxically, a strong regulation may determine a food safety 
improvement and – at the same time – a decrease of producers’ exclusion (with respect to 
the absence of regulation).  
Final remarks 
In this paper, we have provided a normative analysis of the effects of food safety regulation 
within food chains, when the sanitary risk results from the upstream production conditions. 
Our formal analysis has allowed to illustrate the complex strategic interactions among food 
chain participants (upstream producers, downstream processing or retailing firm, final 
consumers). We have shown why the effectiveness of food safety regulation, in terms of 
contamination risk’s reduction, results from a good anticipation of firms’ strategic 
behaviour. A downstream firm may adopt different procurement and commercialization 
strategies (consisting of upstream producers’ selection and remuneration, choice of quantity 
and final price), according to the level of the food safety standard fixed by the public   363
authority. These choices affect not only the level of contamination risk, but also the 
allocation of value among supply chain participants.  
The firms’ reaction to the level of food safety standard is also affected by market’s response 
to the firms’ efforts aimed at improving food safety; namely by the consumers’ risk 
misperception. Hence, with respect to upstream producers’ participation in the market, 
downstream firms react positively to highly demanding food safety standards, when the 
degree of consumers’ risk misperception is relatively low. Moreover, we have shown the 
economic conditions such that a food safety improvement is consistent with the economic 
interests of the other supply chain participants (upstream producers and consumers).  
Furthermore, our paper provides an original contribution in the sense that it explicitly takes 
into account the heterogeneity of upstream producers’ capacities to comply with the food 
safety standard. If a food safety improvement is intended to be achieved, this heterogeneity 
may result in two possible scenarios. The first one consists of strongly selecting upstream 
producers, without encouraging an improvement of production conditions. The second one 
consists of driving an improvement of initial production conditions. The first scenario – 
which results in a great upstream producers’ exclusion from the market – is no longer 
encouraged by the public authority when social reasons or agriculture multifunctionality 
issues are put forward. Nevertheless, the second scenario may be highly costly and require 
overly high public funding. However, we have shown how a highly demanding regulatory 
standard may allow to partially transfer these costs to firms. 
The selecting strategy which we have examined (corresponding to the ENA strategy) is 
frequently observed within vertical relationships in food chains. This strategy allows the 
downstream firm to access to the safest quantity procurement. When it is possible (from a 
technical, legal and economic point of view), the same quantity may be obtained by 
implementing a private food safety standard, more demanding than the legislation (indeed a 
development of private food safety standards from processing and retailing firm has been 
observed). Taking into account this type of strategy in our model, would allow to analyze 
the complementarity and substitutability of these two types of strategies and provide a 
further element to the analysis of firms’ strategic behaviour.  
Moreover, public authorities often implement other types of regulatory tools, which consist 
of making firms liable for food safety damages, by imposing them penalties if a sanitary 
crisis occurs. The main idea behind this kind of regulation consists of making firms liable 
and thus encouraging them to exert precautionary efforts aimed at minimizing the risk of 
contamination damages. This is the reason why a large swathe of the literature aims at 
comparing this “ex-post regulation” to the “ex-ante regulation”, which we have examined 
in this paper by considering that a minimum level of equipement is required for upstream 
producers to access the market
9. 
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Figure 1 - Effects of the food safety standard on the intermediary price 
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